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Abstract Social coordination has been addressed in multi-
agent systems, making use of concepts such as institutions,
norms, commitments, conventions, roles, or trust. In this
paper, we argue the need to tackle open and dynamic envi-
ronments with yet another concept: the notion of a standard,
seen as a measurable and non-committing expectation. Not
much work has been done in the field of multi-agent sys-
tems addressing the evolving nature of roles, especially in
open systems, in which changes in the population bring
about changes in the expectations generated from roles.
Using standards measured from roles as the focus of atten-
tion, we propose an incentive-based mechanism to maintain
roles over time. This approach is put in contrast with
reorganization, which is needed when incentives are not
cost-effective. Different search algorithms are proposed
to illustrate incentive-based maintenance. Some empirical
results are shown based on the principal-agent model from
economics.
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1 Introduction
Since the mid 1990s, a considerable number of works have
been concerned with the development of infrastructures for
supporting social coordination in open multi-agent systems.
Taking inspiration from social sciences, concepts such as
(electronic) institutions (Esteva et al. 2001; Dignum and
Dignum 2001; Fornara et al. 2008), norms (Boman 1999;
Lo´pez y Lo´pez and Luck 2003; Boella et al. 2006; Garcı´a-
Camino et al. 2007; Lopes Cardoso and Oliveira 2008),
commitments (Singh 1999; Fornara and Colombetti 2003;
Fasli 2003), conventions (Walker and Wooldridge 1995;
Conte and Castelfranchi 1999), and roles (Hubner et al.
2002; Fasli 2006; Winikoff and Cranefield 2009; Hermoso
et al. 2013) have been introduced and exploited in the
multi-agent systems domain.
In open multi-agent systems, agents enter and leave
the interaction environment, and behave in an autonomous
and not necessarily cooperative manner, exhibiting self-
interested behaviours. Even when agents establish commit-
ments among them, the dynamic nature of the environment
may jeopardize such commitments if agents are not socially
concerned enough and value more their private goals when
evaluating the new circumstances.
Moreover, in open and dynamic environments one can-
not assume that agents will behave consistently over time.
This may happen either because of the agents’ (lack of) abil-
ity or benevolence attitude. In some cases, an agent may
not be capable of maintaining a certain behaviour stan-
dard throughout its lifetime. In other cases, the agent may
intentionally deviate from its previous performance. It is
therefore important, when considering open environments,
to take into account also the evolution of an agent’s internal
skills or motivations, besides the dynamics of the interaction
environment as a whole.
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These kind of issues have been the motivation for the
development of computational trust models, which may be
used to enable an informed selection of an interaction peer.
Some of these approaches comprise situational trust mod-
els (Rehak et al. 2006; Tavakolifard et al. 2008; Hermoso
et al. 2013; Urbano et al. 2011), in the sense that agents are
evaluated regarding their performance in specific contexts,
situations, or tasks. A typical assumption in these models
is that the measured trustworthiness of an agent is updated
as new experiences and evidence are collected from the
environment. There is therefore no collective perspective on
the group of evaluated agents – each is assessed individu-
ally within the multi-agent system, and therefore no overall
evaluation is performed.
Taking an organizational approach, and looking at the
society from a role-specialization perspective, Hermoso
et al. proposed role evolution (Hermoso et al. 2013) as
a guideline to develop a coordination mechanism that
enhances partner selection processes for task delegation
purposes. This approach is based on examining the agent
society and on identifying “run-time roles” – so building a
role taxonomy – that clusters agents with similar skill pat-
terns for a certain (set of) task(s). From this perspective,
the mechanism provides, as a service, the identification of
the role that labels agents considered as the most suitable to
perform a specific task.
Looking at this role taxonomy as providing structure for
some sort of an artificial organization, in this paper we
address the problem of organizational maintenance. Given
the evolving nature of agents, as pointed above, a problem
faced by the organization in which agents have been (artifi-
cially) embedded is that of timeliness: are the agents within
a role still performing as well as they did at the time of
their assessment? One of two possible options can be chosen
when agents start under-performing. The first is to reorga-
nize so that the role taxonomy becomes accurate again. But
assuming that this reorganization may be costly, the second
approach is to influence the agents’ reasoning by making
use of incentives or punishments, in an attempt to keep them
on track. We propose and exploit the concept of standard to
capture the level of suitable performance that agents have to
show when they carry out different tasks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2
provides an overview of related work, looking at several
means of addressing the problem of social coordination, and
providing support for the concept of standard. Section 3
summarises the work on role evolution this paper is based
on and presents a “standardisation” process from roles to
create standards as objectively measured performances to
be maintained for each role. In Section 4, we describe the
action apparatus and decision rationale of agents based on
the principal-agent model. Then, in Section 5, we put for-
ward a model to establish and adjust incentives in order to
maintain standards over time. Different search algorithms
are proposed in this regard. Section 6 discusses the need
for reorganization and describes a rationale and an approach
to undertake it. We evaluate our proposals and present
empirical results in Section 7. Section 8 provides a critical
discussion of the contributions of this paper and compares
it with other related approaches in the literature. Finally, we
conclude and sketch our planned future work in Section 9.
2 Related work
This paper proposes an approach to tackle open and
dynamic environments, based on the notions of role and
standard. Social coordination is a very active topic in
the multi-agent systems research community. The need
for approaches to tackle the open and dynamic nature of
multi-agent environments has given rise to complementary
approaches that bring into this realm concepts from diverse
fields, such as social, organizational, legal, or behavioural
sciences.
The concept of institution has been borrowed from eco-
nomics (North 1990) and philosophy (Searle 1995) in two
directions. On the one hand, to provide regulated envi-
ronments consisting of computational infrastructures that
frame agent interactions (as e.g. in Esteva et al. (2001) and
Lopes Cardoso and Oliveira (2008)). On the other, to pro-
vide semantics to agent interactions in terms of counts-as
relations (Jones and Sergot 1996; Fornara et al. 2008).
Within these regulated environments the notion of norms
(Boella et al. 2006) has been exploited, as a means to explic-
itly state what to expect from each agent in the system.
Social norms (Tuomela 1995) are based on mutual belief,
consisting of conventions (Walker and Wooldridge 1995;
Conte and Castelfranchi 1999) that may apply to a large
group of agents.
The specification of roles (Hubner et al. 2002; Fasli 2006;
Hermoso et al. 2010) that agents enact in a given soci-
ety goes in the same direction of making a system more
predictable in terms of expected behaviour (Winikoff and
Cranefield 2009). Explicitly handling such expectations as
norms (Castelfranchi et al. 2003) allows one to make role
enacting agents accountable for their actions.
Although closely associated with some approaches on
the use of norms, the notion of commitment (Singh 1999;
Fornara and Colombetti 2003; Fasli 2003) emphasizes a
deliberative view on norm adoption: agents commit to this
as a result of their deliberation process, as opposed to a top-
down view on the use of norms as a design tool for defining
rules of behaviour in an interaction environment.
What seems to be missing from these artifacts for social
coordination is some concept of expectation that is both
measurable and non-committing. Unlike commitments or
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norms, we pursue a means of establishing how well an agent
is able to perform without actually being committed to.
And unlike conventions, which typically apply to collective
behaviour, we are interested in measuring the outcome of
task executions. In order to fill this gap, we use the concept
of standard.
In the literature, one can find a wide variety of works that
adopt the concept of standard for different purposes. The
definition of standard is given by the Oxford Dictionary
of English1 as: “(noun) 1. a level of quality or attainment;
2. something used as a measure, norm, or model in com-
parative evaluations; (adj.) 3. used or accepted as normal
or average”. Therefore, standards describe levels of qual-
ity that are recognized to be normal by individuals within a
type of system.
Standards come about either imposed or emerge as de
facto after a number of observations. Following this dis-
tinction, standards may be classified as de jure or de facto
standards (Salge´ 2005). The former are regulations accepted
and obliged by law, and are endorsed by a formal standards
organization. An example of this type of standards are IEEE
or ISO standards for many different purposes. In contrast,
de facto standards arise when a critical mass simply agrees
to use them in a particular environment. For example, PDF
became a de facto standard for printable web documents,
although it turned into a de jure standard as ISO 19005-1 in
2005. In this paper, we work on de facto standards in order
to capture the measured performance of a set of individuals.
In the field of economics, we can find many approaches
dealing with standards. In Busch (2000), Busch suggests
that standards are mistakenly considered to be mere conve-
nient technologies for organizing and regulating markets so
as to reduce transaction costs (however the cost is assessed).
Nevertheless, the author argues that standards are part of
the moral economy of a society, since they also regulate
behaviour. Therefore, standards create uniformity in het-
erogeneous contexts. Following up the economic approach,
Murphy claims that performance standards emerge from
the desire to provide incentives while simultaneously
paying competitive expected levels of compensation
(Murphy 2000). That is, performance standards can be used
in order to gauge the adequacy of an individual’s perfor-
mance, so prompting the possibility of offering incentives if
behavioural deviation exists. From a psychological point of
view, Bandura and Wood (Bandura and Wood 1989) claim
that when people believe the environment is controllable on
matters of importance to them, they are motivated to per-
form as well as they can, which entails an increase in the
likelihood of success (or societal satisfaction). Moreover,
successful experiences, in turn, provide a self-validation
1http://oxforddictionaries.com/
on the efficacy of the individual and of the environmen-
tal controllability. On the contrary, if people face situations
they believe as being uncontrollable, they are likely to put
in less effort, and this brings about failure. Consequently,
over time, failures take an increasing toll on perceived self-
efficacy and beliefs about how much environmental control
is possible (Bandura and Wood 1989). This author claims
that rates of success and failure are largely determined by
the standards against which attainments are gauged. There-
fore, in layman’s terms, performance standards are used
in order to induce collaborative behaviour from counter-
parts engaged in an interaction. However, as we state in
this paper, performance standards per se are not sufficient
to keep individuals from performing inadequately. This fea-
ture drives us to introduce the concept of incentive as a
means to maintaining the performance standards. How stan-
dards are created has been studied by many researchers
from different fields as well. This process is called stan-
dard setting and concerns the methods to build standards
from the information available (or potentially available) in
the systems (Cizek and Bunch 2007). There exists a wide
range of approaches with regards to standard setting, from
educational purposes (Hambleton et al. 2000) to medical
evaluations (Southgate et al. 2001).
3 Creating standards from roles
Due to the non-stationary nature of open systems, in this
paper, we address the problem of how to maintain agents
from a performance quality perspective as determined by
the roles they are playing. We claim that the notion of spe-
cialized role proposed in Hermoso et al. (2013) might be
used to establish performance standards and so facilitate
the agreement on commitments among agents. We therefore
envision the possibility of going from roles as expectations
of behaviour (Winikoff and Cranefield 2009) or perfor-
mance (Hermoso et al. 2013) to the explicit handling of such
expectations as de facto standards that may be committed
to. Standards are therefore not imposed by the system, but
promoted after they have been identified as current practice
among a group of agents. Standards may thus be exploited
to find appropriate agents, given that they are based on
evidence about their actual capabilities.
The rationale behind creating and maintaining perfor-
mance standards relies on the concept of role proposed by
Hermoso et al. (2013). In this work, the authors claim that in
open systems the evolution of the population should entail
that organisational structures evolve as well. For instance,
some of the roles that existed in our society two centuries
ago, no longer exist nowadays. Therefore, roles are some-
how linked to the different needs of the population at a
certain point in time. With this idea in mind, the authors
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define roles as entities that group a set of agents that out-
perform others for a certain set of tasks. Furthermore, they
introduce the concept of specialisation, from which roles
are created as specialisations of more general roles; e.g. the
role surgeon is created as a specialisation of the role doc-
tor, because those playing the former (they also play the
role doctor) are better skilled for tasks such as operate.
Thus, the authors propose that any society of agents may be
covered by an overlay role taxonomy formed by extracting
capabilities and trust relationships among agents over time.
The mechanism evolves the society’s role taxonomy,
assigning agents to roles.
Then, roles other that agents are playing in the sys-
tem provide information about their expected capabilities
regarding certain interactions (e.g. the provisioning of cer-
tain services or tasks). The authors assume that agents
participating in the system are rational, that is, they behave
as utility maximisers. Thus, the main task of the mech-
anism is twofold: i) to capture similar behaviour among
participants that play a role; and ii) to manage the role tax-
onomy that structures different positions of agents in the
system. The mechanism uses a clustering algorithm to iden-
tify patterns of behaviour, so distinguishing those agents
outperforming others.0 This mechanism has been exhaus-
tively tested in different conditions with open task-oriented
multi-agent systems with heterogeneous and dynamic pop-
ulations, showing a significantly good adaptation in order
to provide an efficient role taxonomy that improves agents’
partner selection.
The mechanism in Hermoso et al. (2013) relies on the
definition of a Task-oriented Multi-Agent System (T-MAS)
as a multi-agent system in which participants have to per-
form a set of tasks (Hermoso et al. 2013). It is defined by a
set of participants Ag, a set of tasks T and a role taxonomy
. We will use the notion of T-MAS throughout the paper
as the base for our approach.
The role taxonomy reflects, at a given time, which agents
are more skilled in the system to perform different tasks.
As the process of role taxonomy evolution is costly, in
this paper, we focus on the period among two consecutive
evolutions. Given a role taxonomy, we will extract perfor-
mance standards from the roles in it. These standards will
emerge as an indicator of what is expected from the group
of agents (the ones playing a specific role) for a particular
task. Thus, standards will be used by agents as an anticipa-
tory measure on the likely outcome of interactions, and may
be used in further negotiations to assure a certain quality of
performance.
Standard setting process Let Attr= {attr1, attr2, ..., attrn}
be the set of attributes that characterizes a task in T . For
instance, in an e-commerce domain Attr= {delivery time,
quality type} would be a set of attributes that
might characterize the task supply good. Let xi be a value
for the attribute attri . For example, xdelivery time = 5 means
that the value for the attribute delivery time is 5. Thus, let
us define the concept of standard:
Definition 1 A standard ς is a tuple 〈r, t, xi〉 that estab-
lishes, for a role r and a task t , a certain expected level of
quality xi for the attribute attri in t .
Note that the concept of standard refers only to one
attribute of the task. That is, the same role and the same
tasks might have different standards for different attributes.
Following up the example given above, the standard for
delivery time might be 5 while the standard for quality type
might be 3.
The level of quality of different attributes is meant to be
a target (xi) representing the expectation an agent perform-
ing a task generates on its counterparts. In order to avoid
our approach being domain-dependent, we take this notion
of targeted standard to be as abstract as possible; that is,
we cannot state a priori in which situations (in any type of
domain), higher or lower outcomes (regarding the standard
value) bring about better or worse outcomes. As we will fur-
ther explain in Section 4.1, a behaviour showing a deviation
exceeding the standard is equally harmful than the one that
does not reach it. Thus if the standard for delivery time is 5
days and a provider takes 7 days delivering a product, that
is considered as undesirable as providing the product in 3
days. Although this would seem to be a bit counter-intuitive,
delivery in advance might mean no storage room for the new
products, while late delivery might entail that the production
line will be halted.
In this paper, we claim that once the role evolution
mechanism described above is in place, roles may be used
to create standards which, in turn, could be included in
commitments that regulate interactions in the system. The
underlying idea relies on the aggregation of values of differ-
ent attributes that characterize (the performance of) a task
within the role, to establish a standard for that role/task
pair, as defined in definition 1. For instance, in open elec-
tronic markets (e.g. eBay), roles might be created in order
to place providers in different categories of provision, while
standards would emerge in order to facilitate better inter-
action processes, and so prevent agents from exhibiting
undesirable behaviours, such as longer delivery times, price
changes, decrease of quality, etc. More precisely, let us sup-
pose we have the role Bike Provider with, among others, the
attributes delivery time and quality type. Let a1, a2 and a3
be three agents playing the role, with average delivery times
of 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Then we could use an aggre-
gation function (e.g. an average) to extract a standard for
the task as ς = 〈r = Bike Provider, t =Provide Bikes
, xdelivery time = 4〉. Using an averaging function may make
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sense if we take into account that the clustering mechanism
obtaining the role taxonomy will, in principle, get us roles
with high cohesion – for which not much deviation should
be expected in the beginning.
4 Incentives and the principal-agent model
After explaing the path from roles as expectations to
commitments based on standards, we are now in a posi-
tion to elaborate on enforcement schemes that enable us
to maintain the stability of the role taxonomy, which
is obtained as explained in Section 3. We will base
our approach on the well known principal-agent model
(Laffont and Martimort 2002; Caillaud and Hermalin 2000)
from economics, in which a principal (a service requester)
requests an agent (the provider) to perform a specific task.
The outcome of the task execution affects the principal’s
utility, who will therefore be interested in influencing the
efforts that the agent puts in performing the task. Efforts
are expressed in terms of available actions, which have
associated execution costs. In the so-called hidden action
setting (Caillaud and Hermalin 2000), it is assumed that the
actual actions as executed by the agent are unobservable
to the principal. Instead, only some performance measures
of such actions are observed. Actions determine, usually
stochastically, the obtained performance. Performance is
therefore a random variable whose probability distribution
depends on the actions taken by the agent. This stochas-
tic nature captures the fact that there are externalities in
the environment that the agent has no control over. The
principal will therefore want to establish an incentive sched-
ule in order to encourage the agent to choose the actions
better leading to an intended performance standard. In our
approach, we slightly change the model by putting forward a
new entity – an incentive policy maker in charge of creating
and applying incentive schedules to keep agents conforming
to different standards. In other words, it is not the principal
(consumer of the service), but this policy maker who sets
and applies incentives to the agents (providers).
4.1 Targeting standards
As described in Section 3, standards are generated through
the use of an averaging function applied to task execu-
tion outcomes of a group of provider agents that have been
clustered within a specific role. Since, according to our
model, standards allow requesters to identify expected val-
ues for the outcomes of tasks when executed by a specific
provider, we consider a standard as a target that agents
should meet. Any deviation from the standard is considered
as a sub-optimal outcome. Figure 1 illustrates this notion,
where ς represents the target standard that the requester
ϛ
1
2
3
Fig. 1 A standard as a target
would expect, and each concentric circle labelled with a
δi denotes equidistant performances to the target. These
concentric lines highlight the fact that we shall consider
deviations in any direction (left or right, upwards or down-
wards) to be equally harmful in terms of expected values.
The arrow pointing towards the centre discloses the aim
of our incentive-based approach, with which we will try to
encourage providers to better target the standard.
4.2 Actions and outcomes
In our model, we will assume that each provider has a set
of actions at its disposal, each with a cost and a probabil-
ity function for obtaining different performance outcomes.
Following a finite model for actions and outcomes, we have
that:
Definition 2 The provider has a set of possible actions A =
{a1, ..., an} at its disposal, each having an associated cost,
denoted by Cost (ai).
Definition 3 The possible observable outcomes that the
provider may obtain is an ordered set Xat tr = {x1, ..., xm}.
Note that Xat tr is the set of possible values for measuring
the performance of the task being evaluated at the attribute
attr. For the sake of simplicity, from now on we take into
consideration only one of the attributes of the task, in order
to minimise the complexity in notation. Then, X refers to a
Xat tr for whatever attribute we are evaluating in the task.
Definition 4 There is a probability distribution function for
X given an action in A, where p(xk |ai) is the probability of
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obtaining outcome xk ∈ X when performing action ai ∈ A.
We have that
∑m
k=1 p(xk |ai) = 1, for all i ∈ [1, n], where
m is the number of possible outcomes and n is the number
of actions.
4.3 Incentives
Given the fact that only outcomes, and not efforts, are
observable to the principal, incentives are specified through
an incentive schedule mapping possible outcomes to incen-
tive values to be collected by the provider, according to
Definition 5.
Definition 5 An incentive schedule I : X → I maps each
possible outcome in X to a specific incentive value in I.
We look at incentives as producing some change in
the utility the agent would obtain by showing its natu-
ral behaviour if no incentives were in place. In this sense,
I = {ι : ι ∈ [−1, 1]}, where positive values denote
percentage increases in utility and negative values denote
percentage decreases in utility. When ι = 0 there is no
incentive in place. Therefore, positive incentives are consid-
ered as rewards for agents to foster the performance of the
actions the incentive is applied to, while negative incentives
represent an attempt to discourage agents from performing
non-desired actions.
4.4 Providers decision rationale
Based on the stochastic model of action outcomes explained
above, each provider is assumed to be an expected utility
maximizer agent. Therefore, when choosing the action a
to perform it will seek to maximize expected utility (Von
Neumann and Morgenstern 1980):
arg max
a∈A
Ea =
m∑
i=1
[p(xi |a) · u(xi, I (xi))] − Cost (a) (1)
where u(xi, I (xi)) is the utility the agent gets from obtain-
ing performance outcome xi , taking into account the incen-
tive I (xi) it will get from such a performance. We define
function u(·, ·) as follows:
u(x, ι) = u(x) · (1 + sens(ι)) (2)
This function encompasses two sub-functions: the prior util-
ity u(x) collected according to the outcome x obtained, and
the effect on this utility of the incentive value ι applied. We
model such an effect with a sensitivity function sens : I →
[−1, 1], which translates an incentive value to its actual
perceived impact on the utility of the agent:
sens(ι) = 2
1 + e−ι·B − 1 (3)
Parameter B ∈ N+ allows us to tune the sensitivity of the
agent with respect to incentives: higher B values make the
agent more sensitive to incentives, while with lower ones
the agent will tend to behave the same regardless of any
incentives.
Figure 2 shows some examples of Eq. 3 to model sens(ι)
with different B values. When providers are not offered any
incentive, they simply obtain the prior utility u(x) as a result
of Eq. 2. Negative incentives (punishments) diminish the
utility of the provider, whilst positive incentives increase it.
Fig. 2 Different curves for
Eq. 3, varying B
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5 Maintaining performance standards
through incentives
Given the previous performance of each provider, on which
standards (via roles) have been defined (as described in
Section 3), it may be the case that agents deviate from
the standard they were able to meet before. This is due to
the evolving nature of the environment in which the agent
operates. Since agents are expected utility maximizers, their
decision regarding which action to employ when executing
a task is conditioned by a number of factors, which we can
identify by analysing Eq. 1. Any changes in these factors
are thus possible causes for a deviation from the standard
characterizing each agent’s assigned role:
1. Costs of the actions agents have at their disposal;
2. Effectiveness of available actions, that is, their proba-
bility distributions over performance outcomes;
3. Prior utilities that agents get from obtaining each possi-
ble outcome;
4. Sensitivity of agents with respect to any incentives they
may be offered.
Note that changes in sensitivity are only relevant when there
are already incentives in place. Changes in action costs may
lead the agent to apply less costly actions, whose outcomes
may be different. Changes in the effectiveness of actions
may be due to environmental factors not under the con-
trol of the agent. In this paper, we assume agents somehow
become aware of changes in any of these factors in order
to take them into account when deciding which actions to
perform. We can easily think of external factors causing
these changes. For instance, in a supply chain, fluctuations
on prices for different inputs (e.g. parts or raw materials
obtained from suppliers) will certainly influence the cost of
executing the task. As for outcome probabilities, the agent
may be able to update these estimations on-line, according
to run-time experience.
These deviations in performance render the role cluster-
ing (obtained as described in Section 3) unfit to represent
the current performances of agents in the system, in terms
of the standards extracted from the roles. Therefore, in
order to maintain role stability when agents deviate from
agreed standards, the system may determine and employ an
appropriate incentive schedule I : X → I (see definition
5). Since actions are not observable, this schedule is based
exclusively on the measurable outcomes of task execution,
which for the sake of defining appropriate incentive sched-
ules are compared with the target outcomes characterizing
the roles. The incentive policy maker (IPM) does not have
access to the factors influencing the agents’ decision making
as this is considered to be private information.
The goal of the IPM is to keep on target the agents
playing a specific role, i.e., agents should obtain outcomes
as close as possible to the target outcome of the role. We
assume the IPM prefers to achieve this aim with the least
incentives needed. In case of failure to accomplish this aim,
or if by doing so the IPM has to apply a too costly incentive
schedule, then it is time to somehow reorganize the agents
that are seen as no longer being able to perform the role at a
bearable cost. This is the topic of Section 6.
5.1 Cost-effective incentive schedules
Given an incentive schedule offered to the agents play-
ing a specific role, we may determine its effectiveness by
looking at the outcomes that are obtained once that sched-
ule is in place. We should also take into account the cost
of applying the incentive schedule. Given the stochastic
nature of agent efforts in terms of obtained outcomes, an
incentive schedule’s effectiveness will typically oscillate
around some value, regardless of there being any changes
in the environment that lead agents to change their chosen
actions. For this reason, in order to compute an incentive
schedule’s quality Q(I), we aggregate a sequence X =〈
x1, x2, . . . , xno
〉
of no obtained outcomes (xi ∈ X ), and
compare them with the target outcome x∗. We define Q(I)
as:
Q(I) = ω · targetHit(X) − (1 − ω) · totalCost(I, X) (4)
targetHit(X) = no −
no∑
i=1
|xi − x∗| (5)
totalCost(I, X) =
no∑
i=1
|I (xi)| (6)
The total cost of the incentive schedule takes into account
actually paid incentives, which depend on the outcomes
obtained. By using the modulus of the incentive we seek
to give the same weight to paid or collected incentive val-
ues – without the modulus the IPM would tend to prefer
penalizing providers as opposed to paying them incentives
or to simply stand still. We thus have that totalCost (X) ∈
[0, no]. On the other hand, target hit measures the incen-
tive schedule’s effectiveness in inducing agents to meet the
target. Any values outside the target are seen as deviations
that need to be minimized in terms of role maintenance
– for simplicity we assume X ⊂ [0, 1], which entails
targetH it (X) ∈ [0, no]. Combining these two functions,
we have Q(I) to be within the range [((ω − 1 · no), ω · no].
Factor ω ∈ [0, 1] allows us to balance the relative impor-
tance of these two conflicting goals, e.g., by giving priority
to obtained performance over how much it costs to achieve
it in terms of incentives paid.
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5.2 Search space
Incentive schedules specify, for each x ∈ X , an incentive
value ι ∈ I. We can therefore represent an incentive sched-
ule as a vector ι = [ι1, ..., ιm], where m = |X | is the number
of possible observable outcomes (see definition 3) and each
ιi ∈ I. In the quest to find out the best incentive sched-
ule, measured both in terms of effectiveness and cost, we
need to reduce the search space for the IPM, e.g. by limiting
the search to incentive schedules composed of values within
the set I · 10	 /10, which gives us discrete incentive values
with 0.1 steps.
Depending on the number of outcomes to consider, this
may still give us a huge number of schedules to experi-
ment with. We can slightly alleviate this issue by taking
into account the intuitive heuristic that we should promote
outcomes closer to the target no less than outcomes far-
ther away. Using this principle, the number of incentive
schedules available is given by
C
|I|+|X |−1
|X | =
(|I| + |X | − 1)!
(|I| − 1)! |X |!
Table 1 shows the number of incentive schedules according
to different sizes of the outcomes set, and taking |I| = 21
(which is the size of set I · 10	 /10 when considering I =
{ι : ι ∈ [−1, 1]}). As we can see, even when considering a
small number of outcomes, the number of incentive sched-
ules is quite large, growing exponentially as |X | increases.
Notice that applying a single incentive to the target out-
come may comprise a suboptimal solution. On one hand,
the IPM does not know how precise are the actions cho-
sen by the agents, which means that the action most likely
obtaining the target outcome may still be quite noisy. On the
other hand, cheaper incentive schedules may be found by
taking into account a combination of incentives to different
outcomes.
Table 1 Number of incentive schedules for varying |X |
|X | Number of incentive schedules
2 231
3 1771
4 10626
5 53130
6 230230
7 888030
8 3108105
9 10015005
10 30045015
5.3 Finding appropriate incentive schedules
Unlike typical approaches in game theory, we do not assume
that agents’ decision variables (action costs, their probabil-
ity distributions over outcomes, or utility functions on those
outcomes and any employed incentives) are known to the
incentive policy maker. We therefore need to go through
the search space of possible incentive schedules in order to
find the ones that prove to be more cost-effective, by actu-
ally trying them out. Given the high number of schedules
to experiment with, some heuristics are needed to guide the
search.
In the following sections we introduce three approaches
for searching for an appropriate incentive schedule. An
important feature of these approaches is that they are meant
to work on-line: the IPM will be searching for the most
cost-effective incentive schedule, while at the same time try-
ing to maximize the accumulated quality of the incentive
schedules that are actually employed.
We should mention at this time that it is not our purpose
to propose a best alternative in terms of search strategies,
but instead to compare a few approaches and see how they
fare in terms of some measurable criteria. One such criterion
is related with how each approach is able to avoid realloca-
tion of agents to other roles (which is further explained in
Section 6).
5.3.1 On-line local search
Given the high number of schedules to experiment with, in
this section we follow a local search approach to seek an
optimal incentive schedule. More specifically, we employ a
hill-climbing procedure, by successively trying to find out
neighbouring incentive schedules that are better than the
currently employed one. In order to find them, however, we
need to try out incentive schedules before we know how
worthy they are, which makes the search more stochastic.
Furthermore, given the dynamics of the environment, these
quality values are not constant over time, and thus explo-
ration must always be an option once a change is detected
in the environment.
One crucial aspect of local search algorithms is the
definition of the neighbourhood function. To generate the
neighbours of an incentive schedule, we introduce a step
change (upwards or downwards) in the incentive value being
applied to any of the outcomes. We then correct the schedule
obtained so that outcomes closer to the target have at least
the same incentive as outcomes farther away (as mentioned
in Section 5.2). This gives us a cardinality of at most 2 · |X |
in the set of neighbours of each possible schedule.
The local search procedure is illustrated in Algorithm 1.
At each step, we start by checking if we are applying the
incentive schedule that is known to be the best (line 2):
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if yes, we update it (line 6). If we are applying a differ-
ent incentive schedule (lines 7-10), we compare the current
schedule with the best known (line 7), and update if it is bet-
ter (lines 8-9). Then we randomly explore, with probability
1−e(||bestQ||−1)·τ (line 11), the neighbours of the best sched-
ule (line 12): ||bestQ|| is the normalized value for bestQ to
the range [0, 1], and τ is a temperature parameter. The bet-
ter the schedule is, the less likely we will explore, exploiting
instead the best schedule we know of (line 14). When a sig-
nificant change is detected in the environment, measured
in terms of a decrease in the quality of the best known
schedule (line 3), we promote exploration by resetting the
temperature τ (line 4); τ is then decayed in every step
(line 16) according to the time we allow the search to pro-
ceed (see Section 6), until it reaches nearly 0 (determining
no exploration).2
In order to compute the quality of each incentive sched-
ule we need to employ it sufficient time to aggregate new
evidence to fill in sequence X (see Eq. 4).
5.3.2 On-line tabu search
The search space we are dealing with is quite plateaux-like,
given the fact that many neighbours of a given schedule
will have the same exact quality. This is a challenge for an
approach based on hill-climbing, such as the one presented
2Note that this temperature mechanism is not related to simulated
annealing, in which the temperature determines the probability of
choosing a worse solution; in Algorithm 1 we use it simply to induce
and then to reduce exploration, while a new schedule will only be
kept if it is found to be better than the best we know of (hence the
hill-climbing flavour).
in Section 5.3.1. One well-known technique to tackle such
kind of search spaces is tabu-search, which we explore in
this section. Tabu-search includes a list of forbidden nodes
(schedules) with the aim of escaping local-optima.
Algorithm 2 shows our approach. The tabulist contains
a small number of the most recently visited incentive sched-
ules; whenever we add an element to this list (line 13), if
the number of elements exceeds its size we discard the most
outdated one (in a first-in-first-out fashion). Besides keep-
ing the best schedule found so far, we also keep the point
from which we will continue the search, by following one
of its neighbours that are not in the tabu-list (line 12). The
remaining parts of the algorithm are similar to Algorithm 1.
5.3.3 Reinforcement learning
Learning on-line, i.e. by interacting with the environment
and obtaining appropriate rewards, is the aim of reinforce-
ment learning (RL) (Sutton and Barto 1998). In this section,
we look at the problem of searching for an optimal incentive
schedule as a reinforcement learning problem. More specif-
ically, the setting we are addressing is similar to an n-armed
bandit problem (Sutton and Barto 1998). The incentive pol-
icy maker (the learner) will try to determine, by exploring
its action3 set, the best possible incentive schedule I whose
3We emphasize that these are the learner’s actions (i.e., those available
to the IPM), and not the actions of the provider agent as discussed
in Section 4.2. We here use the same term action because it is well
established in RL literature.
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quality Q(I) is updated in terms of a reward obtained from
the environment.
The problem faced by the learner is a continuing task:
given the sources for deviating behaviours identified in
Section 5, providers may decide differently when facing a
specific incentive schedule at different times, which makes
the problem non-stationary. Reinforcement learning natu-
rally encompasses this kind of situations by maintaining
a trade-off between exploitation (taking advantage of the
actions that have been found as good) and exploration (try-
ing out other actions whose effect is not totally known or
up-to-date). However, the main problem with a RL approach
in our case is related with the size of the action space, as
shown in Table 1.
Our approach is shown in Algorithm 3. Given the
observed reward Q(·) (obtained as in Eq. 4), we update the
estimated Q value qv(·) for the incentive schedule being
applied (line 2). Note that, unlike the previous algorithms,
Q(·) is here taken as a reward that is used to update the
current estimate on the true value of the schedule being
used. We then update the best schedule in a way similar
to the previous algorithms (lines 3-11). As in the previous
approaches, when a significant change is detected in the
environment we reset the temperature τ (lines 4-6), which
will be later subject to decay (line 18).
Given the size of the action space, we take an incremen-
tal approach to the number of actions to consider: schedules
that are neighbours of the current one are added to the action
space (if not already there), where for bootstrapping they are
initialized with the Q value estimate of the current schedule
(line 12). Finally, an -greedy action selection policy deter-
mines that we explore with probability 1 − e(||bestQ||−1)·τ a
random action (lines 13-14), or else we stick with the best
one (line 16).
6 Re-organization
Given the organizational flavour of role taxonomies, we
have preferred an incentive-based policy to a reorganization
of the system in terms of up-to-date skills of agents. This
preference is due to both practical and fundamental rea-
sons. The computational complexity of creating or updating
a role-taxonomy may be considerable, especially when little
is known about the agents that are to take part in this orga-
nization, and thus about the roles that are to be created (see
e.g. the clustering approach in Hermoso et al. (2010)). Fur-
thermore, the very notion of roles as a descriptive facet of
an organization presumes some notion of stability, as roles
provide a means to identify specific agents within the orga-
nization. If we reorganize too often, this sense of long-term
existence is lost.
Nevertheless, there will be situations in which reorga-
nization is a better option as compared to applying incen-
tive schedules with the aim of influencing the providers’
behaviour. On one hand, although an effective incentive
schedule may be found, applying it may bear a significant
cost. On the other hand, there will be situations in which
an effective incentive schedule is not found. This may hap-
pen either because the search procedure employed is not
able to find it (local search approaches are typically vulner-
able to local optima) in a reasonable time (e.g. due to a very
large search space), or because environmental changes have
reduced the influencing ability of the IPM, therefore lower-
ing the effectiveness of the most effective incentive schedule
available.
Having this in mind, we add a “reorganization” ability
to the system. In our setting, reorganizing aims at increas-
ing the cohesion of the roles in terms of the skills of the
agents to which those roles have been assigned. As men-
tioned above, this reorganization step is taken to be costly.
However, instead of using a more thorough approach such as
in Hermoso et al. (2010), in this paper we assume that we are
able to assess the role that each agent is able to perform best,
without any incentives. In that sense, to reorganize means to
reassign an agent to that role.
Algorithm 4 expresses the policy that we follow to decide
when to reallocate an agent. In order to assess if we should
reallocate an agent, we must take into consideration its
most recent outcomes (X[]), as well as the quality of the
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most recently applied incentive schedules (Q[]). These val-
ues will be updated while the agent executes tasks, and
while the IPM tries to find out appropriate incentive sched-
ules, respectively. Given the continuous search for better
incentive schedules,4 the stochastic nature of outcomes, and
possible environmental changes, both outcome and Q val-
ues may oscillate. For this reason we must consider a set of
recent values for these two variables.
In Algorithm 4, we start by checking if the outcomes
obtained are significantly off-target, or if the average Q val-
ues are below a given threshold δ (line 2). If so, we either
remember the point in time where we have detected this
agent’s “default” (line 4), or if detected before we deter-
mine if sufficient time (at least ) has elapsed for the
IPM to find an appropriate incentive schedule (line 5) –
this is the case when we choose to reallocate the agent
(lines 6-9). Reallocating the agent entails that the agent will
have a new target outcome. In case the agent is not devi-
ating, we simply forget its previous default time, if any
(line 12).
The two parameters δ and  allow us to adjust the
implicit cost of reorganization, as compared to that of
search. By increasing the value of the default threshold δ,
we demand for more cost-effective incentive schedules to
prevent reorganization. Lower δ values, on the other hand,
will allow for less cost-effective schedules, meaning that
we consider reorganization as being a more costly operation
to undertake. Similarly, a higher time frame  will allow
the search algorithm employed by the IPM to have more
4Except for very low temperature values, see Algorithms 1-3.
time, while a lower  value will tolerate less deviations to
occur.
7 Evaluation
We have used Repast Simphony as a simulation frame-
work to evaluate our approach. In this section, we present
the results of different experiments carried out to demon-
strate the suitability of the different methods for maintaining
the providers attached to the standards. We have designed
experiments to present how our proposal learns appro-
priate incentives for different sets of providers, by using
the learning and optimization approaches put forward in
Section 5.
7.1 Provider setup
First we need to present how we set up the providers for
the experiments. We will work with populations of 100
providers. We initialize each provider as follows:
– Effort-Cost. The costs of efforts (see definition 2) are
initialized randomly following a uniform distribution
within [0, 1].
– Effort-Outcome. We need to endow providers with a
method for generating possible outcomes in X from dif-
ferent chosen efforts (see definition 4). We model this
using beta distributions, in order to allow for stochastic
outcomes, avoiding a deterministic provider behaviour.
The shape of this type of functions is controlled by
two parameters, α and β. We set α = 1 + (c ∗ p −
c) and β = p − (c ∗ p − c), where c is a cen-
tre value (corresponding to one of the outcomes in X )
and p is a peak factor. We set c randomly with a uni-
form distribution within X , and p randomly with a
uniform distribution in the range [100, 200]. As men-
tioned in Section 5.1, we assume X ⊂ [0, 1]; we set
|X | = 7.
– Outcome-Utility. The prior utilities (see Eq. 2) for dif-
ferent outcomes that may be obtained are initialized
randomly following a uniform distribution within [0, 1].
In all experiments presented in this section, we have set
B = 10 for Eq. 3.
7.2 Experimental dynamics
Once we have clarified how the population of providers is
set up now we proceed to explain the functioning of exper-
imental scenarios. We will run every experiment 1000 time
steps. In each time step, every provider will be required to
perform an action. The provider will, naturally, choose the
action that maximises its expected utility (following Eq. 1).
Inf Syst Front
In order to test how different methods for learning incen-
tive schedules perform, we introduce changes at ticks 100
and 600. Changes are applied over 50% of the providers. We
show results for two types of scenarios:
– Soft changes. This scenario tests the ability of the
search methods to find appropriate incentive schedules
when smooth changes happen. In both changing ticks,
changes consist of applying variations on the costs of
each effort the provider has at its disposal: Cost (ai) ±
0.25. Increasing or decreasing the cost is modelled as
flip-a-coin stochastic process. The other two functions
that define the provider behaviour remain unchanged.
– Random changes. This scenario tests the robustness
of the learning methods against severe changes in the
providers’ population. In both changing ticks, we mod-
ify providers’ effort costs, outcome utilities and effort-
outcome beta distributions in a random way. That is,
we randomly re-initialise costs and prior utilities, and
set new random centres and peak values for the beta
distributions.
7.3 Configuration of search and reorganization algorithms
We will denote each search algorithm as follows: LS (on-
line Local Search), TS (on-line Tabu Search) and RL (Rein-
forcement Learning); NS represents a No Search approach,
i.e., no incentives will be used.
Regarding the different parameters for the search and
reallocation algorithms we have set these up as follows:
– For the reallocation policy (see Algorithm 4),  = 300
(the mechanism allows a time window of 300 time steps
to let the search method find out suitable incentives),
and δ = 0.8 (average Q values below 0.8 will be seen
as defaults).
– For RL, we set α = 0.8 (see Algorithm 3), allowing the
algorithm to quickly adapt to changes.
– For LS, TS and RL, the value to reset the temperature τ
is 10.
– For calculating Q(·) values, we use ω = 0.7 (see Eq. 4),
therefore giving priority to achieve the target instead of
to the associated costs.
These values were chosen after some empirical testing.
7.4 Metrics
We use two different metrics to interpret the obtained
results. We use the average Q(·) obtained by the agents in
every time step. This is calculated as described in Eq. 4.
On the other hand, we are also interested in measuring
how good different methods are in terms of the number of
reallocated providers. The lower this number the better the
method performs, since this represents a better learning of
incentives, so saving a costly re-organisation process, as we
pointed out in Section 6.
7.5 Results
In order to explain the functioning of the different
methods in terms of obtained outcomes we present in
Fig. 3 the average outcomes obtained by providers over time
when LS tries to learn incentives. In that figure we observe
the different 7 outcomes we define this particular experi-
ment, as well as the standard values (black straight lines) for
each of them. Marked and in colour are the different average
outcomes of the providers. That is, every Oi line denotes
the average outcome of the providers allocated in a partic-
ular target outcome. From the curves, we can notice how
average outcomes deviate from the target outcomes, since a
Fig. 3 Functioning of LS in
terms of average outcomes for
random changes scenario
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Fig. 4 Evaluating results of different search methods for soft changes
significant number of providers change their behaviour. As
we have mentioned, changes occur in the system at time
steps 100 and 600, so between these times, the learning
method should be able to keep part of the providers back
to the target outcome. This process is observed after every
change since the average outcomes tend to drft back to the
standards over time. In those cases in which incentives are
not effective, re-organisation is needed and providers are
reallocated to other target outcomes (around ticks 400 and
900).
Figure 4 shows the results for the scenario in which soft
changes are applied. Figure 4b depicts the result of each
method in terms of the number of reallocated providers,
together with the absence of incentives for comparison pur-
poses. As expected, the three approaches we propose (LS,
TS and RL) greatly outperform the case with no search
(less reallocations needed), which illustrates the possibility
of using incentive schedules to keep agents on track at a
bearable cost.
Following Fig. 4a, we can see that the proposed meth-
ods allow to quickly find out proper incentives to keep most
providers behaving according to standards. The population-
change ticks are clearly observable, while the reallocation
ones are less so, indicating the apparent success in LS, TS
and RL. The method obtaining the best Q(·) values is LS,
followed closely by TS. The online nature of RL, trying
to explore the search space from the beginning, makes it
less cost-effective in this scenario, where initially incentive
schedules are not needed at all.
Figure 5 shows the results for the scenario in which
random changes are applied. In Fig. 5b, we observe the
result of the methods in terms of the number of reallocated
providers. The three approaches still outperform the case
with no search. However, there still exists a high number
of providers that must be reallocated in this case, because
the search algorithms are not able to find incentive sched-
ules that are cost-effective enough to prevent reallocations.
In fact, in this scenario the inflicted changes may become
so drastic that could make the methods useless, since even
extreme incentives may be short in preventing providers
from misbehaving (it may be even the case that the random
change has made it impossible for the provider to obtain the
target outcome no matter what).
Figure 5a confirms the hard task of finding cost-effective
incentive schedules: crisp changes are noticed after the
search period, when agents are reallocated to appropriate
Fig. 5 Evaluating results of different search methods for random changes
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roles. As in the previous case, LS is the method obtaining
the best Q(·) values.
8 Discussion
In this paper, we have put forward a theoretical approach
to build standards from roles in dynamic task-oriented
MAS. Although the creation of standards has been
more deeply studied in the fields of economics and
finance, in the MAS community there have been some
attempts to dynamically build social structures to fos-
ter interactions. For instance, there are many approaches
on how norms are formed and how they emerge from expec-
tations. In Winikoff and Cranefield (2009), the authors
present a work that gathers users expectations for social
interactions to transform them into logic formulae that
can be used in order to check an eventual outcome. The
main difference with our approach is that they use explicit
requests to the users to gather their expectations, while we
automate that process by using the role creation mechanism.
Other approaches related to this issue are Castelfranchi
et al. (2003) and (Conte and Castelfranchi 1999), in which
the authors discuss how prescriptions might emerge from
individual expectations, eventually forming norms.
There are economic approaches also founded on the
emergence of standards, such as Sherstyuk (2000), in which
Sherstyuk proposes a method to set an appropriate perfor-
mance standard to develop optimal contracts, i.e., contracts
in which the provider agent’s best choice is to keep the
standard through its action. In this paper, however, we are
not interested in obtaining optimal performance standards;
instead, we are concerned about how to maintain the level
of those standards once they have been created.
Along the same lines, (Centeno et al. 2011) present
an approach on adaptive sanction learning by exploring
and identifying individuals’ inherent preferences without
explicit disclosure of information. That is, the mechanism
learns over which attributes of the system should modifica-
tions be applied in order to induce agents to avoid undesired
actions. In our case, we adhere to a more formal scenario,
in which interactions are regulated by means of some kind
of contracts and, besides, we assume that attributes that may
be modified by means of incentives are already known by
the mechanism.
The approach taken in Lopes Cardoso and Oliveira
(2011) also assumes that the mechanism knows which
attributes it should tweak in order to influence agents’
behaviours, namely by adjusting deterrence sanctions appli-
cable to contractual obligations agents have committed to.
The notion of social control employed there is similar to
our notion of role standard maintenance, although instead
of a run-time discovered standard, a fixed threshold is used
to guide the decisions of the policy maker. Moreover, only
sanctions (seen as fines) are employed to have a deterrence
effect of discouraging agents from misbehaving, while here
we are more interested on incentivising agents to do their
best while executing the tasks they are assigned to.
In fact, in the model and experiments we have reported in
this paper we encompass both incentives (positive rewards)
and penalties (negative sanctions) – both dubbed incentives
in definition 5. It may be arguable whether agents in an open
system will be willing to submit themselves to sanctions
for the benefit of a service provided by the open system’s
infrastructure. That is, which other assumptions must be
in place so that this scenario is reasonable? Our guess is
that this will depend on domain-dependent issues which are
out of the scope of this paper. In any case, the theoretical
approach that we have proposed remains untouched if we
find it more reasonable to consider proper incentives (i.e.
positive rewards) only. This will however have an impact on
the performance of the search approaches we have designed
and experimented with.
One could argue that the proposed incentive mechanism
is exploitable by providers, once they notice that by inten-
tionally under-performing they are able to get access to
incentives that would otherwise not be needed. However,
such agents are likely to lose in the long run, as soon as the
system finds it better to reallocate the agent to another role.
Implicitly, we assume that different roles provide different
statuses to agents, which has an effect on their private goals
or utility.
9 Conclusions and future work
Standards are used as a means to articulate contracts in
social interactions. When dealing with organisational multi-
agent systems, roles can be used as a reference in order to
create standards: a standard can be seen as a measure of
the quality of performance of agents playing a certain role.
In this paper, we have proposed a mechanism that, on the
one hand, creates performance standards from roles discov-
ered at run-time in a multi-agent system and, on the other,
provides incentives to make agents maintain a level of per-
formance as close as possible to the standards. When this is
not possible, reorganization is the way to eliminate the gap
between the descriptive and functional nature of roles and
the capabilities of agents.
Although the model is kept mainly theoretical in this
paper, which has made the approach more general and
domain-independent, we envisage some possible applica-
tion domains. In manufacturing systems, agents fulfilling
different roles when building a craft are supposed to meet
and maintain a standard during their work. In social sys-
tems such as ruled electronic markets, while standards may
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not be known a priori, they can be discovered at runtime
and artificially maintained for the sake of the overall market
community.
The complex simulation we have implemented provides
us a large range of experimentation options that we intend
to explore. We believe that it is important to experiment
with the incentive schedule learning approach in a changing
environment, taking into account the causes for deviations
identified in Section 5.
Finally, a more comprehensive framework will embrace
the whole cycle from role taxonomy generation, standards
measurement, maintenance through incentives, and reor-
ganization. All these steps are needed to address open
multi-agent systems, given their dynamic nature.
Acknowledgements The present work has been partially funded
by the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science under projects
OVAMAH-TIN2009-13839-C03-02 (co-funded by Plan E) and Agree-
ment Technologies (CONSOLIDER CSD2007-0022, INGENIO 2010)
and by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness by the
project iHAS (grant TIN2012-36586-C03-02).
References
Bandura, A., & Wood, R. (1989). Effect of perceived controllability
and performance standards on self-regulation of complex decision
making. Journal of personality and social psychology, 56(5), 805–
814.
Boella, G., van der Torre, L., Verhagen, H. (2006). Introduction to
normative multi-agent systems. Computational & Mathematical
Organization Theory, 12(2-3), 71–79.
Boman, M. (1999). Norms in artificial decision making. Artificial
Intelligence and Law, 7(1), 17–35.
Busch, L. (2000). The moral economy of grades and standards. Journal
of Rural Studies, 16(3), 273–283.
Caillaud, B., & Hermalin, B. (2000). Hidden action and incentives.
Teaching Notes, U.C. Berkeley, accessed at http://faculty.haas.
berkeley.edu/hermalin/agencyread.pdf.
Castelfranchi, C., Giardini, F., Lorini, E., Tummolini, L.uca. (2003).
The prescriptive destiny of predictive attitudes: From expectations
to norms via conventions. In: R., Alterman & D., Kirsh (Eds.) In
Proceedings of the 25th annual meeting of the cognitive science
society, Boston, (pp. 222–227).
Centeno, R., Billhardt, H., Hermoso, R. (2011). An adaptive sanction-
ing mechanism for open multi-agent systems regulated by norms.
In Proceedings of the 2011 23rd ieee international conference
on tools with artificial intelligence, ICTAI ’11. IEEE Computer
Society, (pp. 523–530).
Cizek, G.J., & Bunch, M.B. (2007). Standard setting: A guide to
establishing and evaluating performance standards on tests. SAGE
Publications.
Conte, R., & Castelfranchi, C. (1999). From conventions to prescrip-
tions. Towards an integrated view of norms. Artificial Intelligence
and Law, 7(4), 323–340.
Dignum, V., & Dignum, F. (2001). Modelling agent societies: co-
ordination frameworks and institutions. In: P., Brazdil & A.,
Jorge (Eds.), Progress in artificial intelligence: Knowledge extrac-
tion, multi-agent systems, logic programming, and constraint solv-
ing, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, (vol. 2258. Springer,
Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 191204).
Esteva, M., Rodrı´guez-Aguilar, J.A., Sierra, C., Garcia, P., Arcos,
J.L. (2001). On the formal specifications of electronic institutions.
In: F., Dignum & C., Sierra (Eds.), Agent-mediated electronic
commerce: The european agentlink perspective, Lecture Notes in
Artificial Intelligence, (vol. 1991. Springer, pp. 126147).
Fasli, M. (2003). Reasoning about the dynamics of social behaviour.
In Proceedings of the autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
conference (aamas ’03). ACM Press, (pp. 988–989).
Fasli, M. (2006). On the relationship between roles and power: prelim-
inary report. In Proceedings of the 2nd computer-aided law and
advanced technologies forum (clat 2006) part of the 21st acm sym-
posium on applied computing (sac 2006). ACM Press, (pp. 313–
318).
Fornara, N., & Colombetti, M. (2003). Defining Interaction Protocols
using a Commitment-based Agent Communication Language. In:
Second international joint conference on autonomous agents and
multiagent systems, ACM, New York, Melbourne, Australia, (pp.
520–527).
Fornara, N., Vigan, F., Verdicchio, M., Colombetti, M. (2008). Arti-
ficial Institutions: A Model of Institutional Reality for Open
Multiagent Systems. Artificial Intelligence and Law, 16(1), 89–
105.
Garcı´a-Camino, A., Rodrı´guez-Aguilar, J.A., Sierra, C., Vasconcelos,
W. (2007). Norm-Oriented Programming of Electronic Institu-
tions: A Rule-Based Approach. In: P., Noriega J., Va´zquez-
Salceda G., Boella O., Boissier V., Dignum N., Fornara E.,
Matson (Eds.), Coordination, organizations, institutions, and
norms in agent systems II, LNAI 4386. Springer, Berlin Heidel-
berg New York, (pp. 177–193).
Hambleton, R.K., Jaeger, R.M., Plake, B.S., Mills, C. (2000). Set-
ting performance standards on complex educational assessments.
Applied Psychological Measurement, 24(4), 355–366.
Hermoso, R.amo´n., Billhardt, H.olger., Ossowski, S.ascha. (2010).
Role evolution in open multi-agent systems as an information
source for trust. In 9th international conference on autonomous
agents and multi-agent systems. IFAAMAS, (pp. 217–224).
Hermoso, R., Billhardt, H., Ossowski, S. (2013). Trust-based role coor-
dination in task-oriented multiagent systems. Knowledge-Based
Systems, 52, 78–90.
Hubner, J.F., Sichman, J.S., Boissier, O. (2002). A Model for the Struc-
tural, Functional, and Deontic Specification of Organizations in
Multiagent Systems. In: G., Bittencourt & G. L., Ramalho (Eds.) Q2
In Advances in artificial intelligence – 16th brazilian symposium
on artificial intelligence. Springer, Brazil, (pp. 439–448).
Jones, A., & Sergot, M. (1996). A Formal Characterisation of Institu-
tionalised Power. Logic Journal of the IGPL, 4(3), 427–443.
Laffont, J.J., & Martimort, D. (2002). In The theory of incentives: The
principal-agent model. Princeton paperbacks. Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press.
Lopes Cardoso, H., & Oliveira, E. (2008). Electronic Institutions for
B2B: Dynamic Normative Environments. Artificial Intelligence
and Law, 16(1), 107–128.
Lopes Cardoso, H., & Oliveira, E. (2011). Social control in a normative
framework: An adaptive deterrence approach. Web Intelligence
and Agent Systems, 9, 363–375.
Lo´pez y Lo´pez, F., & Luck, M. (2003). Modelling Norms for
Autonomous Agents. In: E., Chavez J., Favela M., Mejia A.,
Oliart (Eds.) In Fourth mexican international conference on com-
puter science. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos, (pp. 238–
245).
Murphy, K.J. (2000). Performance standards in incentive contracts.
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30(3), 245 –278.
North, D.C. (1990). In Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rehak, M., Gregor, M., Pechoucek, M. (2006). Multidimensional
context representations for situational trust. In Proceedings of
Inf Syst Front
the ieee workshop on distributed intelligent systems: Collective
intelligence and its applications, DIS ’06. IEEE Computer Soci-
ety, Washington, DC, (pp. 315–320).
Salge´, F. (2005). National and international data standards. In: P.A.,
Longley M.F., Goodchild D.J., Maguire D.W., Rhind (Eds.) In
Geographical information systems. principles, techniques, man-
agement and applications. 2nd edn. John Wiley, New York,
(pp. 693–706).
Searle, J.R. (1995). In The Construction of Social Reality. New York:
Free Press.
Sherstyuk, K. (2000). Performance standards and incentive pay in
agency contracts. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102(4),
725–736.
Singh, M.P. (1999). An ontology for commitments in multiagent
systems: Toward a unification of normative concepts. Artificial
Intelligence and Law, 7(1), 97–113.
Southgate, L., Hays, R.B., Norcini, J., Mulholland, H., Ayers, B.,
Woolliscroft, J., Cusimano, M., McAvoy, P., Ainsworth, M., Haist,
S., Campbell, M. (2001). Setting performance standards for med-
ical practice: a theoretical framework. Medical Education, 35(5),
474–81.
Sutton, R.ichard.S., & Barto, A.ndrew.G. (1998). In Reinforcement
Learning: An Introduction. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Tavakolifard, M., Knapskog, S.J., Herrmann, P. (2008). Cross-situation
trust reasoning. In Proceedings of the 2008 ieee/wic/acm inter-
national conference on web intelligence and intelligent agent
technology - volume 03, WI-IAT ’08. IEEE Computer Society,
Washington, DC, USA, (pp. 67–71).
Tuomela, R. (1995). In The Importance of Us: A Philosophical Study
of Basic Social Norms. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Urbano, J., Rocha, A.P., Oliveira, E. (2011). In Transactions on compu-
tational collective intelligence v, (pp. 84–105). Berlin, Heidelberg:
Springer-Verlag.
Von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1980). In Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior, 3rd edn. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Walker, A., & Wooldridge, M. (1995). Understanding the Emergence
of Conventions in Multi-Agent Systems. In: V., Lesser & L.,
Gasser (Eds.) In Proceedings of the first international conference
on multi-agent systems. MIT Press, San Francisco, (pp. 384–389).
Winikoff, M., & Cranefield, S. (2009). Eliciting expectations for
monitoring social interactions. In Proceedings of the first inter-
national conference on computer-mediated social networking,
ICCMSN’08. Springer, Berlin Heidelberg New York, (pp. 171–
185).
Ramn Hermoso is an assistant professor at the University of
Zaragoza. Formerly, he worked as a senior research officer at the Uni-
versity of Essex and as an assistant professor at the University Rey
Juan Carlos in Madrid (Spain). He received his PhD from the Univer-
sity Rey Juan Carlos in 2011. His research interests span from trust and
reputation mechanism in multiagent systems to the innovation man-
agement in social networks. He is author of several publications in
journals, books and international conferences, and has participated in
more than 15 research projects, funded by both national and interna-
tional institutions. He has been involved in organising international
events and peer reviewing for international journals, conferences and
workshops.
Henrique Lopes Cardoso obtained his PhD on Informatics Engineer-
ing from the University of Porto in 2011. He is an Assistant Professor
at the Faculty of Engineering of the University of Porto (FEUP) and
a researcher at the Artificial Intelligence and Computer Science Lab
(LIACC). He is also a member of the directive board of the Portuguese
Association for Artificial Intelligence (APPIA). His research interests
include distributed AI, social coordination and regulation of multi-
agent systems, adaptive learning agents, and multi-agent systems tools.
He has been an active member of relevant European research networks,
namely the COST Action IC0801 on Agreement Technologies and the
European Network for Social Intelligence (SINTELNET).
Maria Fasli is a Professor in the School of Computer Science and
Electronic Engineering, University of Essex where she has been a
member of staff since 1999. Her research interests lie in agents and
multi-agent systems and their theoretical foundations and practical
applications, machine learning, analysing and modelling complex data
(structured/unstructured), Big Data, as well as semantic-based tech-
niques for user profiling and adaptation including modelling context.
She has published in journals and international conferences and spe-
cialists workshops in the field of artificial intelligence and multi-agent
systems and has participated in international competitions such as
the Trading Agent Competition. She has been involved in organis-
ing/chairing international events and peer reviewing for conferences
and funding organisations. She is the author of Agent Technology
for E-commerce (Wiley, 2007). In 2006, she was awarded a National
Teaching Fellowship by the Higher Education Academy (UK) for her
innovations and contributions to learning and teaching.
